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JOHN WORRALL 
 
1. Introduction: Grünbaum’s attack on Popper’s notion of increase of content 
as the hallmark of scientific advance 
 
Most of us believe that theory-change in science has been a rationally analysable 
process. We believe, that is, that when one theory, Newton’s for example, is replaced 
as the accepted theory in science by a rival, Einstein’s in the same example, it is 
because the newer theory turns out to be better than the old in some objective sense 
and a sense, moreover, crucially related to the experimental evidence.  Even those 
who have abjectly surrendered (at any rate on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays) to 
an overly subjectivist form of Bayesianism, believe this really – hence their desperate 
pointing in the direction of (in my view, unavailing) results concerning the ‘washing 
out of priors’.  The problem has always been to construct a set of agreed criteria of 
theory-appraisal that would convincingly yield this generally agreed result. (Of course 
by ‘most of us’ here I mean ‘most philosophers of science’; nothing I say will cut 
much ice with some of our benighted sociologist colleagues.) 
 
Let’s, in accordance with usual practice, separate two types of theory-change: those 
‘theory-modifications’ associated with Kuhnian ‘normal science’ or Lakatosian intra-
research programme change – let’s call them “mini-changes” - on the one hand, and 
the sorts of (apparently) radical theory change associated with Kuhnian ‘revolutions’ 
or switches of Lakatosian research programme  – let’s call them “mega-changes” - on 
the other.  A much-analysed “mini-change” is that which led to the prediction of the 
existence of the planet Neptune.  Here the initial theoretical system consisted of 
Newton’s laws of motion plus the principle of universal gravitation together with the 
auxiliary that there are 7 planets of which Uranus is the furthest from the sun; and the 
change was to a revised framework involving those same general laws but now 
conjoined with Adams’s and Leverrier’s new auxiliary assumption that there is a 
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further trans-Uranian planet, Neptune. (Of course a number of other auxiliary 
assumptions such as that the only non-negligible forces on any planet in the solar 
system are its gravitational interactions with the sun and other planets were common 
to both the old and new frameworks.)  Examples of  “mega-changes” include the shift 
from the corpuscular to the wave theory of light in the early 19th century or that from 
Newtonian to relativistic physics in the early 20th.   
 
All the instances I just mentioned are of changes that were accepted within science 
and that seem intuitively like success stories. Other proposed changes – we will meet 
some examples later - have, on the contrary, not been generally accepted. If science is 
the rational process that most of us believe it to be there must, it seems, be some 
clear-cut criterion that separates the sheep from the goats – some general 
characteristic that marks out the rationally or scientifically justified changes from the 
rest.  Karl Popper several times argued for the claim (attractive for its unity, at any 
rate) that both mini- and mega-changes, when rational or scientific, always in fact 
involve an increase in content.1   As we shall see in a moment, Popper attempted 
various different (semi-) formal analyses of the idea of content-increase, but the 
intuitive idea seems, at first glance, clear at any rate in the case of mini-changes.  
Take again the celebrated case of Adams and Leverrier: their postulation of the 
existence of the trans-Uranian planet, Neptune, was certainly ad hoc in the 
straightforward sense that it was specifically introduced as an attempted solution of 
the problem posed by the inconsistency of the data on Uranus’s orbit with the 
conjunction of Newton’s theory and the then accepted auxiliaries; it was, however, 
also “content-increasing”, and therefore potentially a genuine scientific advance, in 
that the new theoretical framework including Adams’ and Leverrier’s revised 
auxiliary not only had the correct consequences about Uranus’s orbit, but also of 
course predicted the existence of the new planet and, at least roughly, its mass and 
orbit. 
 
The Adams and Leverrier shift, then, produced a theoretical framework that seems to 
have had extra content, extra content which, moreover, lent itself to independent 
                                                 
1 As usual, more complicated than this. Popper sometimes appeals to the ‘dimension’ of  a theory – 
intuitively a measure of the simplicity of its falsifiers –as a measure of falsifiability and therefore, in 
his terms, acceptability ahead of the evidence. However he never gets close to satisfactorily analysing 
this notion, and his preferred account does seem to be in terms of content-increase. 
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empirical test.  This is to be contrasted with cases in which the modified theoretical 
framework (modified by the inclusion of a new auxiliary assumption at the cost of 
another) allegedly merely solves the problem it was introduced to solve – that is, the 
modified framework gets right the phenomena that were inconsistent with the 
unmodified framework, but seems to have no further content and hence cannot be 
tested independently – independently, that is, of the phenomena that already tested 
(and in at least one case clashed with) its predecessor.  
 
Instances that have often been cited as examples of failure of content-increase are the 
invocation of a major epicycle in Ptolemaic astronomy to explain planetary stations 
and retrogressions and (incorrectly as Grünbaum showed)2 the postulation of the 
Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction hypothesis within classical physics to explain the 
anomalous ‘negative’ result of the Michelson-Morley experiment.  Taking the simpler 
Ptolemaic case: the initial model of a planet, Mars, say, travelling on a single circular 
orbit around a stationary earth, predicts that we will observe constant eastward motion 
of the planet around the sky (superimposed, of course, on a constant apparent diurnal 
westward rotation with the fixed stars); this is directly refuted by the observation that 
Mars’s generally eastward motion is periodically interrupted by times at which its 
observed motion slows until it halts momentarily and then begins briefly to move 
backwards in a westward direction before again slowing and turning back towards the 
east.  The introduction of an epicycle of suitable size and the assumption that Mars 
moves around the centre of that epicycle at a suitable velocity while the whole 
epicycle itself is carried around the main circular orbit (now called the deferent) leads 
to the correct prediction that Mars will exhibit these stations and retrogressions.  
However, according to the often cited story, this is all that the epicycle does: it merely 
restores consistency with the previously observed data but the resulting system has no 
further content and hence cannot be independently tested.   This case is also often 
cited as an example of a move which is ad hoc ‘in the pejorative sense’ – there is of 
course nothing wrong with introducing a new hypothesis or theory specifically to 
solve a certain empirical problem, but, so it has been claimed, such solutions are 
cheap if they do not admit of tests independent of the phenomena they were 
introduced to explain and they cannot, it seems, admit of independent test, if the 
                                                 
2 refs 
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theoretical systems of which they are part fail to exhibit content-increase over the 
predecessor theoretical system. A potential mega-change proposed at any rate by 
some thinkers – I use the term lightly – would be the replacement of Darwinian by 
Creationist theory.  But this would clearly fail the content-increase test  - a failure that 
is part of the justification of the fact that this proposed theory-shift has not been made 
within proper science.   
 
So, allowing for a certain amount of rational reconstruction, and using T to stand for a 
‘central’ or ‘core’ theory and A to stand for an appropriate conjunction of auxiliary 
assumptions, Popper had two main claims:3
 
1. It is at least a necessary condition for the scientific legitimacy of the mini-shift 
from T&A to T& A’ that it be content-increasing. 
2. It is at least a necessary condition for the scientific legitimacy of the 
‘revolutionary’ mega-shift from a theoretical system built around T to one 
built around T’ (inconsistent with T) that it be content-increasing. 
 
And of course he tied this notion of content-increase to his ideas about falsifiability 
being the hallmark of science and increased falsifiability being the hallmark of 
progress in science.  (In line with his – exaggerated - emphasis on falsifiability, 
Popper usually  - though not always4 - fails to stress the surely intuitive further 
requirement that at least some of these content-increases be successful, that is lead to 
further empirically-checkable predictions that are actually correct.  We will return to 
this later, let’s for the moment just concentrate on content-increase as an alleged 
necessary condition for scientific legitimacy.) 
 
Popper offered no less than six different more detailed analyses of the content of a 
theory that might be used to underwrite these two theses involving the intuitive idea 
of content-increase.  In a series of three important articles in the British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science in 1976,5 Adolf Grünbaum demonstrated in 
uncompromising detail just why five of Popper’s analyses of the notion of the content 
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of a theory (and when one theory exhibits increased content relative to another) 
cannot in fact coherently underwrite either of the theses 1 and 2.  The Popperian 
analyses that Grünbaum attacked are those that do not attempt to introduce a notion of 
the measure of a theory’s content. These non-metrical construals of content-increase 
seem initially to have the better chance of underwriting theses 1 and 2 within a 
Popperian framework at least. This is because Popper’s favoured metrical notion 
ct(T),  given by ct(T) = 1- Prob(T), seems pretty obviously hopeless.  In fact this  way 
of measuring content, when conjoined with Popper’s favourite thesis that all universal 
theories have probability zero, trivially yields the result that all such universal theories 
have ct = 1.  Hence on Popper’s favoured metrical notion, there can be no increase in 
content in going from Newton’s to Einstein’s theory or from the theoretical 
framework of classical physics pre-Adams and Leverrier to that framework after the 
postulation of the existence of Neptune.  This is because both theories and both 
frameworks would, according to Popper, have the same - maximal - content. 
 
The natural non-metrical construal of the content of any theory is as its consequence 
class – the deductively closed set of the theory’s logical consequences.  Since all such 
classes are infinite (denumerably infinite in any sensible language), the idea of using 
cardinality considerations to distinguish theories with different amounts of content is 
a clear non-starter and the only ordering relation that seems to offer itself is the subset 
relation.  However, as Grünbaum quickly shows, the idea that we could use this 
notion of content to underwrite the claim that Einstein’s theory has greater content 
than Newton’s will not remotely work either. The basic reason is that the two theories 
are logically inconsistent and hence each entails the negation of the other.  Assuming 
that the individual theories N and E taken singly are consistent, then of course their 
mutual inconsistency implies that it cannot be the case that C(N) ⊆  C(E), let alone 
C(N) ⊂C(E), since, for one thing,  N ε C(N) but not ε C(E).     
 
Grünbaum showed that essentially the same difficulty afflicts Popper’s notion of the 
informative content of a theory (just the set of sentences inconsistent with the theory) 
and the empirical content of a theory (on Popper’s idiosyncratic formulation the 
intersection of the informative content with the set of sentences expressible in purely 
observational terms – that is, the set of observation sentences that contradict the 
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theory). Obviously since E and N contradict one another, E ε IC(N) and N ε IC(E) so 
again on the assumption that each is internally consistent neither IC(E) ⊂ IC (N) nor, 
more importantly for Popper’s concerns, IC(N) ⊂ IC (E) holds.  Similarly, since the 
inconsistency between the two theories cannot be restricted to the purely theoretical 
level, there are empirical consequences that Newton has that are not also entailed by 
Einstein (indeed ones whose negations are entailed by Einstein’s theory) and so again 
the subset relation required by Popper trivially fails to hold.  
 
What Popper seems to mean by the “problem content” of a theory T can be 
constructed by simply taking every logical consequence a of T, and appending a 
question mark to it – that is PC (T) = {is it the case that a?/a ε C(T)}. As he himself 
points out, this characterisation supplies a 1-1 correspondence between PC(T) and 
C(T); and so it follows that the same inability to underwrite his theses 1 and 2 that 
affects his characterisation C(T) applies equally well to PC(T). 
 
This leaves the idea that the content of a theory should be thought of as the set of 
questions to which it gives answers. Popper talks of this as a ‘generalisation’ of the 
Tarskian content C(T) and certainly the notion of the question-answering content of a 
theory is altogether vaguer and hence less susceptible to clear-cut negative results.  
However, Grünbaum argued that Popper’s attempt to show that Einstein’s theory has 
greater content than Newton’s fails on this question-answering construal of content 
just as badly as it does on the other construals.6
 
It might seem at first sight that Popper had much better prospects of underwriting his 
claim about content increase when it comes to cases of ‘mini-changes’ – such as the 
Adams and Leverrier case.  But Grünbaum demonstrated that there too none of 
Popper’s accounts of content can possibly succeed.  The basic problem is exactly the 
same. Collapsing Newton’s theory together with those auxiliaries that remained 
constant in this episode into T, letting A be the pre-Adams-and-Leverrier statement of 
                                                 
6 I agree with Adolf’s conclusion here, though I have some qualms about some of the assumptions. I 
guess how exactly (more formally) we construe ‘ordinary language’ questions is always bound to be 
somewhat arbitrary – but I am one of those who favour a two-valued approach avoiding ‘obviation’ (so 
I am one of those who thinks that the right answer for me to the famous question ‘Have you  stopped 
beating your wife?’ is ‘I haven’t’ (ie no)). But this just pushes Popper’s ‘question content’ toward his 
‘problem content’ to which Adolf’s strictures clearly apply (this is why I agree with the conclusion)… 
 6
the number, positions and masses of the planets, and A’ the corresponding statement 
post-Adams and Leverrier (now including the assertion of the existence of Jupiter), 
then A’ is of course inconsistent with A, and so a fortiori is T&A’ with T&A. Hence 
as before since ¬ (T&A ε T&A’) (assuming the latter consistent) it cannot be the case 
that T&A ⊂ T&A’.  And the IC, EC and PC construals all fail for essentially the same 
reason.  Finally Grünbaum goes on to argue that it is at best unclear that Popper’s 
question content QC can do any better.  
 
Popper’s aim in the case of such “mini-changes” was of course, as noted earlier, to 
use the idea of content increase to differentiate the Adams and Leverrier case and 
others of its scientifically creditable ilk from allegedly ad hoc shifts such as that 
supposedly involved in the invocation of the Lorentz-Fitzgerald hypothesis or 
Ptolemaic epicycles.  The idea was that those theory-shifts that many have identified 
as ad hoc in the pejorative sense are exactly those in which there is no increase of 
content.  Clearly, then, Grünbaum’s demonstration that Popper has produced no sense 
in which the change of an auxiliary assumption from A to an A’ inconsistent with it 
ever produces increased content has an equally negative impact on Popper’s thesis 
about what characterises ad hoc hypotheses.    
 
There is surely no way to save Popper’s particular analyses of content-increase and of 
ad hoc hypotheses from Grünbaum’s onslaught.  Nonetheless it is difficult – for me at 
least – to relinquish entirely the idea that there are important intuitions here which, 
when properly analysed, will supply notions that play major roles in the account of 
rational theory-change in science.  In the remainder of this talk, I will attempt to move 
towards what I hope will prove more defensible analyses of these notions (of course 
whether in the end they should count as analyses of ‘content increase’ or ‘adhocness’ 
rather than as analyses of replacements for these notions is up for grabs). I should say 
that in doing this, I am by no means attempting to reopen a possibility that Grünbaum 
sees himself as having closed off.  To the contrary, and with his invariable precision 
and clarity, Grünbaum is explicit that his strictures apply, directly at least, only to 
Popper’s own attempted definitions and characterisations.  Indeed he himself 
mentions in passing one of the crucial ideas behind what I think is the right approach 
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to the issue of content-increase in the case of “mega-changes”;7 and he of course 
developed his own hierarchy of types of adhocness (albeit while inclining to agree 
with Hempel that there may in the end be no precise, logical account of the notion to 
be had).  A more accurate, but altogether clumsier, title for this talk would thus have 
been ‘Adhocness and content-increase: is there life after Grünbaum’s demolition of 
Popper’s analyses?’ 
 
2. ‘Scientific Revolutions’ and Content-increase: life after Grünbaum? 
 
It is not clear that even Popper’s starting-point when it comes to grand theory-change 
(“mega-change”) was sensible.  Do we really have anything like a clear-cut intuition 
that Relativity theory has greater content than Newton’s theory? Certainly the former 
is empirically accurate over a greater range; but that seems an entirely different matter 
– a question of having more correct (empirical) content rather than having more 
content simpliciter.  Let’s start then instead with a case where we do surely have 
clear-cut intuitions. 
 
Consider the shift to Newton’s theory from the union of Galilean physics and 
Kepler’s laws. There seems here to be a clear intuitive sense in which this is a shift to 
a theory of greater content – while Galileo’s laws cover the motion of freely falling 
bodies close to the earth’s surface and terrestrial projectiles, and Kepler’s laws cover 
the motions of the planets, Newton’s theory is a truly universal theory covering all 
motions of all bodies, terrestrial bodies, planets and all other bits of matter both in the 
solar system and beyond; moreover, while Galileo’s and Kepler’s laws tell us only 
how projectiles and planets move, Newton’s theory goes on to tell us why they move 
as they do. 
 
Notice however that, as decades of criticism of Nagel’s account of ‘homogeneous 
reductions’ has revealed, and as was already seen clearly in advance by Duhem and 
later by Popper,8 even in this case matters are not as straightforward as they might 
initially appear.  Newton’s theory is strictly inconsistent with Galileo’s laws and with 
                                                 
7  Reference to Havas. Of course G is right that Popper cannot help himself to Havas’s ideas to 
explicate his notion of content-increase. Section 2 of my paper can be viewed simply as an elaboration 
of this point. 
8 refs 
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Kepler’s laws – for example, the acceleration of a body falling from the top of the 
tower of Pisa, according to Newton’s theory is, even ignoring its gravitational 
interaction with any body in the universe except the earth, not constant as it falls as 
Galileo’s law of free fall asserts it to be, but is rather a function of the body’s (of 
course changing) distance from the centre of mass of the earth; similarly, the planets 
do not move in the strict ellipses required by Kepler’s first law according to Newton’s 
theory because of the planet’s gravitational interaction with bodies other than the sun.  
 
As a result of this inconsistency, Grünbaum’s argument contra-Popper again applies 
to show that the content of Galileo’s laws or the content of Kepler’s laws (taking the 
natural consequence class notion of content) cannot form proper subsets of the content 
of Newton’s theory.  What is it then that underlies this – here, I think, firm – intuition 
that Newton’s theory constitutes content-increase over its predecessors?   Basically, 
surely, the fact that we can derive as special cases of Newton’s theory, not Galileo’s 
laws or Kepler’s laws themselves, but rather replacements for them which, although 
strictly inconsistent with the laws they replace, are either empirically 
indistinguishable from them, or distinguishable only within some very small margin.9
 
This is clearest in the case of Galileo’s law of free fall.  As we already saw, Newton’s 
theory (again making the approximating assumption that the only gravitational effect 
on the falling body is that of the earth and ignoring air resistance) entails that the 
body’s acceleration is not constant but rather satisfies 
 
a = G.mE/r2
 
where G and the mass of the earth mE are both constant alright, but  r is the – of 
course changing – distance between the centre of mass of the body and the centre of 
mass of the Earth. However, setting r = r’ + R, where R is the radius of the Earth and 
r’ the distance from the earth’s surface, we see that, even when the body is at the top 
of the Tower, R is massive in comparison with r’, and so r in fact changes very little – 
in fact by far too little to be observationally detectable - during the fall.  We have then 
a replacement for Galileo’s law of free fall (call it G’) which is (a) observationally 
                                                 
9 ref to John Watkins 
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indistinguishable from G and (b) unlike G itself is a consequence of Newton’s theory.  
Letting N be Newton’s theory, the judgement of content-increase is based, properly 
based, not on the non-fact that C(G) ⊂  C(N) but rather on the genuine fact that C(G’) 
⊂  C(N). Notice moreover that this relationship is asymmetric: neither N itself, nor 
any observationally indistinguishable modification of it N’, follows as a special case 
of G. 
 
Another theory-shift that intuitively seems clearly content-increasing is the one from 
Fresnel’s elastic solid wave theory of light to Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory.  
Here the intuitive judgement is that Maxwell’s theory does everything that Fresnel’s 
did, saving just as well all the known phenomena of visible light, but it also revealed 
that the visible spectrum is but a meagre portion of the whole electromagnetic 
spectrum, and of course Maxwell’s theory had much to say about the non-visible part 
of the spectrum.  Maxwell’s theory swallows whole the content of Fresnel’s theory 
and goes on to add much distinctive content of its own. 
 
Again however this loose description suggests a much closer agreement with the 
Nagel reduction model than is strictly justified.   Fresnel’s theory is not a special case, 
a sub-theory, of Maxwell’s. How could it be when it centrally presupposes an all-
pervading elastic solid ether, vibrations in which constitute light, while Maxwell’s 
theory – at any rate in what might be called its definitive or mature form – rejects 
such an elastic ether and attributes light instead to a displacement current in a sui 
generis electromagnetic field?  (It is well known that Maxwell himself and some of 
his followers, such as Kelvin, hoped to show that the electromagnetic field could be, 
in turn, explained as resulting from the contortions of some underlying mechanical 
medium of the Fresnel type. However the repeated failure to produce a ‘mechanical 
model’ that was independently testable led eventually to the acceptance that there is 
no such medium and that the field is a separate, independent entity.) 
 
But although Fresnel’s theory itself is not a sub-theory of Maxwell’s, a structurally 
identical facsimile of it is. If we concentrate on the mathematical equations entailed 
by Fresnel - for example, his equations for the relative intensities of the light polarised 
in the plane of reflection and in the plane orthogonal to it, of the reflected and 
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refracted beams when a beam of light is incident at the interface between two 
optically different media -  these equations are also derivable from Maxwell’s theory. 
Once again, although these are the exact same equations, it is not Fresnel’s theory that 
is thus derived within Maxwell – the terms in the equations representing the 
amplitudes of the waves refer for Fresnel to the extent to which real particles of the 
ether are moved away from their equilibrium positions during the passage of the light, 
while for Maxwell those same terms, standing in the same relations, refer to forced 
vibrations of the electric and magnetic field vectors. 
 
So, as in the Galileo to Newton case, the judgement that there is content-increase in 
the Fresnel to Maxwell case is based, properly based, not on the fact that C(F) ⊂  
C(M), but rather on the fact that there is an F’, in this case involving exactly the same 
equations as F, and for which C(F’) ⊂  C(M) – in the straightforward and uniquely 
legitimate sense that M entails F’. As before, this is asymmetric: there clearly is no 
“facsimile” M’ of M such that it is a sub-theory of Fresnel’s.  Basically because 
Fresnel’s theory is silent about any connections between optical and electro-magnetic 
phenomena 
 
Returning then to the case of the switch from Newton to Einstein, in dispute between 
Popper and Grünbaum, this seems to me best thought of as an amalgam of the two 
cases we just considered.  As before there is, I think, no clearcut sense in which 
Einstein’s theory has greater content than Newton’s theory itself; instead there is a 
replacement N’ for Newton’s theory which is (a) such that its empirically testable 
predictions are, over a significant range of phenomena, observationally 
indistinguishable from those of Newton’s theory itself and (b) is, unlike Newton’s 
theory, a genuine sub-theory of Einstein’s.  The logical shift from Newton’s theory, 
N, itself to N’ involves however both of the manoeuvres we saw exemplified in these 
two earlier cases. As in the Fresnel-Maxwell case, although we finish up with 
equations which do much of the same predictive work, the terms involved are 
interpreted quite differently within Newton’s and Einstein’s theory – we may still 
have the m and the t, for example, but now they mean quite different things.  And as 
in the Galileo-Newton case (though unusually, indeed seemingly uniquely, not in the 
Fresnel-Maxwell one), N’ is not identical to N (even laying aside interpretative 
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issues) but only observationally equivalent by virtue of ‘tending to it’ under a certain 
limiting process. (The only reason we don’t quite talk this way in the Galileo-Newton 
case is that we know we can’t build towers that have heights comparable to the radius 
of the earth so that the restriction to ‘ordinary’ falls can be left implicit.) 
 
Once again the relationship of content-increase involved here is, I take it, asymmetric: 
there is no ‘replacement’ E’ for Einstein’s theory E which stands in the same 
relationship to N as our N’ does to the whole of E. 
 
Some of you will not be surprised to hear that I think that all this reflects, and reflects 
credit on, a position called structural realism10 – though this doesn’t of course mean 
that it is false! 
 
In sum, then, I think that there is a sense in which the progress of science – mature 
science – has been, despite so-called revolutions, progressive because ‘essentially’ 
cumulative: the newer theory in a complex but significant sense retains the older one 
and adds extra stuff.  Popper tried to capture this sense in which science is 
‘essentially’ cumulative in a way that Grünbaum demonstrated was naïve.  But the 
judgment of essential cumulativity (at least for “mature science” – i.e. physics) can be 
salvaged via a more sophisticated analysis. 
 
 
3. Ad hoc versus Content-increasing moves within research programmes: life 
after Grünbaum? 
 
Let’s now turn to the case of “mini-changes” – change of ‘auxiliary’ rather than 
‘central’ or ‘core’ theory.  Here again, remember, Popper claimed that what 
differentiates scientifically acceptable changes of auxiliary assumption such as the 
Adams and Leverrier postulation of Neptune from cases like the Ptolemaists’ 
invocation of epicycles is that the scientifically acceptable shifts are content 
increasing.  Those shifts that are not content increasing are ad hoc (in the pejorative 
sense). Again, Grünbaum showed that Popper’s attempts to underwrite these 
                                                 
10 ref 
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judgments totally fail: the good shifts just cannot exhibit overall content increase in 
any serious sense, because the theoretical system shifted to is inconsistent with the 
one shifted from. Again however there seems to be an important differentiating 
characteristic at play here – something to do with the good shifts exhibiting increased 
testability  - a characteristic that Popper perhaps sensed but certainly failed accurately 
to describe.  Can we do better? 
 
It’s best, I think, to begin by considering a few illustrative examples. 
 
3(a) Pure Adhoccery: Velikovsky 
 
Most cases from real science that have attracted claims of (pejorative) adhocness turn 
out, on inspection, to be less than clear-cut.  As Adolf himself pointed out, the LFC – 
often regarded as a purely ad hoc response to the negative result of the Michelson-
Morley experiment - is in fact independently testable by the Kennedy-Thorndike 
experiment. Moreover, although I rounded up one of the usual suspects in citing 
Ptolemaic epicycles to suggest the idea of an ad hoc hypothesis (indeed ‘adding an 
epicycle’ is sometimes used as effectively synonymous with indulging in adhockery), 
and although major epicycles were undoubtedly introduced ad hoc by Ptolemaic 
astronomers explicitly to account for planetary stations and retrogressions (amongst 
other things), their introduction was in fact independently testable. The epicycle 
construction entails, when conjoined with the independently plausible assumption that 
apparent brightness of the planets is correlated with their closeness to us, the correct 
observational result that any planet will be at its brightest when in the middle of its 
retrogressive phase.  It is best, then, to look for clear-cut (or more nearly clear-cut) 
cases in the realms of pseudoscience. 
 
Immanuel Velikovsky developed a theory about a giant chunk of material that 
somehow broke away from Jupiter and took up a promising career as a comet that 
made two separate series of orbits around the earth before settling down to a quieter 
life as the planet Venus. The "close encounters" between the comet and the earth 
were, according to the theory, responsible for such remarkable (alleged) phenomena 
as the falling of the walls of Jericho and the parting of the Red Sea.  Velikovsky 
accepted that such cataclysms could hardly have been restricted to selected parts of 
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the Middle East and looked for records of similar natural pyrotechnics on the same 
scale in other contemporary record-keeping cultures. The search revealed some loose 
corroborations but also some much sharper and embarrassing gaps.  Velikovsky was, 
however, far from stumped: he postulated that, for the scribes in some cultures, the 
events associated with the close encounters with the comet had proved so traumatic 
that "collective amnesia" had set in.  Which precise cultures had suffered from this 
regrettable complaint? Why, exactly those for which we have reasonably reliable and 
extensive records , which, however, fail to mention any cataclysms on the appropriate 
scale: collective amnesia afflicted precisely those cultures C1..... Cn for which no 
suitable records of cataclysms exist. 
 
This really does get close at least to a pure case.  We have, I take it, good reason to 
believe that we have all the records that there are to be had from cultures that were 
keeping fairly extensive records at the time of, say, the exodus from Egypt.  Hence all 
that the collective amnesia hypothesis does is reconcile Velikovsky’s basic cometary 
hypothesis with the known records, some of which had been at odds with that theory 
when combined with the initial natural auxiliary that record-keeping cultures would 
have recorded events on the scale of the parting of the Red Sea or the fall of the walls 
of Jericho (worth a line in anyone’s diary one might have thought!)  There is no way 
of further testing Velikovsky’s modified theory – at least not with this sort of 
historical data.  We have an initial theoretical system consisting (at least) of the basic 
Velikovsky cometary hypothesis V and the ‘natural’ auxiliary N about record-keeping 
cultures, the conjunction V& N is inconsistent with some data e, e is then used to 
construct a modified version N’ of the auxiliary (the collective amnesia version), the 
conjunction V & N’ then automatically yields e – it was bound to do so by the manner 
of its construction; but it yields absolutely no further empirically checkable prediction 
that was not already yielded by V & N. 
 
3(b) “Degrees of adhocness”: Ptolemy vs Copernicus on planetary stations and 
retrogressions 
 
The usual story about Ptolemaic epicycles is, as we have already noted, incorrect. But 
this does not mean that the underlying intuition that planetary stations and 
retrogressions give stronger empirical support to Copernican theory than to Ptolemaic 
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theory is also incorrect.  As we saw, once the major epicycle has been introduced to 
explain the observed phenomenon of stations and retrogressions of, say, Mars, it 
proceeds to make the independently testable prediction (modulo plausible background 
assumptions) that Mars will seem brightest when in the middle of its retrogressive 
phases.   
 
But compare this to the Copernican account.  This of course postulates that we are on 
a moving observatory. This postulate, together with the observationally based thesis 
that Mars and the Earth have different orbital periods, entails that the Earth will 
periodically overtake Mars as they both move eastward round the sun. This directly 
entails that Mars, as it in fact follows an uninterruptedly eastward path will appear to 
stand still and briefly retrogress.  And this Copernican account in turn directly entails, 
no less than the Ptolemaic account did, that Mars is at its nearest point to the Earth 
(and hence at its apparent brightest) when in the middle of its (now apparent) 
retrogression.   
 
Speaking intuitively but I believe fundamentally correctly, Copernican theory supplies 
a direct reason for both the stations and retrogressions and the fact that planets seem 
brightest when retrogressing. On the other hand, the basic Ptolemaic geostatic theory 
gives no reason at all why there should be observable stations and retrogressions – 
major epicycles have to be introduced and tailored specifically to yield them. Once 
introduced, they have an independently testable consequence, one that turns out 
moreover to be empirically correct.  But the overall empirical support remains greater 
for Copernican theory: it gains full support from both phenomena, the Ptolemaic 
theory from only one of the two. This is because Ptolemaic theory needs the first 
phenomenon to justify the introduction of a feature into the theory whose parameters 
are then fixed on the basis of that phenomenon.  Copernicus is, if you like, ‘less ad 
hoc’ than Ptolemy in this respect; though fundamentally the judgment is one about 
empirical support and can be expressed without using the notion of adhocness at all. 
 
3 c) ‘Ad hoc’ is not a four-letter word: Neptune again (and ‘Vulcan’) 
 
Allan Franklin once gave a talk at LSE entitled ‘Ad hoc is not a four letter word’. His 
title was of course undeniably literally correct, but his message was less trivial though 
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still true:  namely, that so-called ad hoc manoeuvres are very frequent in science and 
are often methodologically entirely kosher. Although he took it that he was arguing 
against those – like myself – who had emphasised the negative aspect of some 
manoeuvres often called ‘ad hoc’, there is in fact no contest here at all.  
 
Many have of course emphasised the need to demarcate pejorative from non-
pejorative charges of adhocness, but nonetheless this whole issue has often seemed 
obscure (sometimes because it has been obscured!). In terms of ordinary usage ad hoc 
means something like ‘introduced for, or addressed to, some specific end’ (Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary: ‘ for this or the particular purpose’).  And clearly there 
can be no general condemnation of a scientist for introducing a theory for the specific 
purpose of dealing with some initially anomalous result – such a condemnation would 
make no sense in general and would in any case convict many of the most celebrated 
successes in the history of science.  
 
Taking the paradigm example yet again, it is of course quite clear that the postulate of 
a trans-Uranian planet was specifically introduced to deal with the fact that the orbit 
of Uranus proved stubbornly anomalous: that is, that the predictions made on the basis 
of Newton’s theory and the then accepted auxiliaries were wide of the observational 
mark.  Moreover, since obviously some specific anomalous phenomenon might 
provide the occasion for some theoretician to start in earnest to look for a new theory, 
whether central or auxiliary, without any observable features of that phenomenon 
being used in constructing the new theory, we should add that of course in this case 
the anomalous orbit of Uranus not only provided the impetus for Adams and Leverrier 
to don their thinking caps, the details of the orbit were crucial in constructing the 
particular replacement assumption that they came up with.  To a first approximation, 
Adams and Leverrier assumed that Newtonian theory was correct and freed up some 
initially fixed parameters – ones specifying the number, masses and orbits of the 
planets in the solar system – and then finally worked out what value those now free 
parameters had to have in order to account for the observed details of Uranus’s orbit.  
 
The postulate was ad hoc in the straightforward literal sense, it was ad hoc in the 
stronger sense that observed data (those concerning Uranus’s orbit) were actually 
used in the construction of the postulate (that is, the data played an indispensable 
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heuristic role in the process that led to the postulate) and yet the successful prediction 
of the existence of Neptune, based on that postulate, is of course regarded as one of 
Newtonian theory’s – and indeed theoretical science’s – greatest successes.  
 
Naturally it is important here that Neptune was actually observed.  Popper’s obsession 
with falsifiability meant that he overemphasized the importance of a theoretical 
framework’s making extra predictions and underemphasized the importance of some 
of these predictions turning out to be observably or experimentally correct.  This is 
vividly underlined by the Vulcan episode. As is again well known, prior to his attempt 
to explain the anomalous motion of Uranus, Leverrier had worked on the anomalous 
advance of Mercury’s perihelion. In what proved an unsuccessful dry run for the 
successful Neptune project, in the attempt to account properly for Mercury’s orbit, 
Leverrier postulated an intra-Mercurial planet, tentatively named Vulcan.  This 
proposed switch was exactly on a par with the later successful Neptune case – both 
were in the ordinary sense ad hoc responses to anomalous observations; both involved 
working backwards from the assumption that Newton’s theory had to be correct in 
order to deduce what further auxiliary assumptions needed to be made to give the 
right account of those observations; and both led to new theoretical systems that not 
only accounted for the anomalous data they were based on, but also made extra 
testable predictions.  The difference between the two, and the reason why the Vulcan 
move is not counted as a great scientific success, is of course the simple fact that the 
predictions made in the Vulcan case turned out to be observationally incorrect – 
despite a good deal of assiduous inspection of the heavens close to the sun during 
eclipses no evidence of any moving object misidentified as a fixed star was found; put 
loosely, while Neptune was discovered observationally after having been predicted, 
there turned out to be no such thing as the planet Vulcan. 
 
 
3(d) Steps toward an improved analysis 
 
The first couple of steps toward improving on Popper’s analysis seem, given these 
examples, fairly straightforward. 
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Suppose that we have a ‘mini’-change from T&A to T&A’, what makes such a 
change one of the good guys? 
 
Well, first of all nothing to do with overall content increase.  As Adolf suggests at one 
point, Popper seems to have been seduced by the idea that what happens in these 
cases is that an extra auxiliary is added – as if Adams and Leverrier simply added the 
assumption that Neptune exists. In fact of course they “modified” (i.e. contradicted) a 
previous auxiliary. The pre-Adams and Leverrier theoretical system indeed has a very 
definite, falsifiable, bold implication about Neptune – that it doesn’t exist and 
therefore that you won’t see it anywhere in the sky at any time! 
 
What did increase in this episode is correct observational content.  The post Adams 
and Leverrier system makes at least one prediction which is different from anything 
predicted by the corresponding pre-system and different from the observational data – 
in this case the initially anomalous data on Uranus’s orbit - that not only clashed with 
the original system but, in my view altogether more importantly, was used in the 
construction of the Adams and Leverrier modifying hypothesis. Notice that this 
qualification about the new observationally testable predictions being different from 
the data used in the construction of the new system is necessary to prevent 
Velikovksy’s switch involving the collective amnesia hypothesis counting as a ‘good 
guy’.  Intuitively of course this switch is, to say the least, somewhat questionable 
from a scientific point of view – yet clearly Velikovsky’s modified system has correct 
entailments not shared with its predecessor: namely that no records of suitable 
cataclysms will be found in cultures C1..... Cn (the ones specified to have suffered 
from ‘collective amnesia’).   
 
This seems, then, to be an important difference between the Velikovsky shift and the 
Leverrier one.  However, reflection on our third example, that of Ptolemy and 
Copernicus, shows that our initial question was a little naïve.  When, as is invariably 
the case, we are adjudicating between two different rivals, it is not a question of 
demarcating the ‘good guys’ – the good shifts from frameworks of the form T & A to 
T & A’ – from the bad guys, but more generally telling the better guys from the less 
good.  The introduction of a major epicycle within Ptolemaic theory to account for 
planetary stations and retrogressions is, as we saw, both independently testable and 
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independently confirmed.  Hence this shift - while ad hoc in the ordinary sense - did 
more than simply accommodate the initially anomalous phenomenon it was 
constructed to accommodate: it made an extra prediction, one that turns out to be 
empirically correct. Hence, on our original classification, this shift should count as 
one of the good guys – and indeed, despite the bad publicity epicycles have achieved, 
I think that this is correct so far as it goes. But it doesn’t of course necessarily mean 
that, when it comes -  centuries later -  to comparing the general Ptolemaic framework 
to the rival Copernican one, stations and retrogressions supply no empirical reason for 
preferring the newer framework. On the contrary and despite the fact that many 
commentators have seen the issues here as essentially pragmatic, concerned with 
increased harmony and the like, it seems to me that the right judgement is that 
although Ptolemy gets some empirical support here, Copernicus gets more. Having 
used one phenomenon (stations and retrogressions) to fix the value of a parameter, 
Ptolemaic theory goes on to predict and get support from a further phenomenon (time 
of maximum brightness). Copernican theory on the other hand gets both phenomena 
right straight off the bat – there is no relevant free parameter to fix; the very fact that 
we are, according to Copernican theory, on a moving observatory yields both the 
stations and retrogressions and the fact that the planet will be at its brightest while 
retrogressing straight off.  Ptolemy gets some empirical support, Copernicus gets 
more. 
 
In sum, although Popper raised the question of when it was or was not “legitimate” to 
modify an auxiliary assumption while retaining the ‘central’ theory of some 
theoretical framework, this was always the wrong question to ask.  The real question 
is simply about empirical support (anathema to Popper, of course): modifications of 
auxiliaries are to be assessed simply in terms of how much extra empirical support the 
overall theoretical system complete with modified auxiliary achieves compared to the 
initial unmodified system.  
 
The fact that such modifications will standardly be made ad hoc – that is, will be 
addressed to some known experimental difficulty – is in itself neither here nor there. 
However, when the data that constitutes the difficulty is actually used in the 
construction of the modified auxiliary (standardly by fixing the value of some initially 
free parameter) that data itself cannot supply support for the overall theory (even 
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though given the basic theory it may supply conclusive support for the particular 
modified auxiliary). 
 
There are two types of case where phenomena do supply empirical support for the 
overall theory from which they follow (as opposed to supplying support for some 
particular specific or auxiliary assumption, on the supposition that the basic overall 
theory (the ‘core’ theory) is to be taken for granted).  The first case – exemplified by 
stations and retrogressions within Copernican theory – is where some phenomenon 
follows ‘naturally’ from the basic theory without the need for any special assumption 
based on data. The second and more common case – exemplified by the impact of the 
discovery of Neptune on Newtonian theory – is where some particular version of an 
overall theory is developed on the basis of a particular set of data (the details of 
Uranus’s orbit in this case) but that particular version of the theory turns out to entail 
independently checkable further data. 
 
This all needs more detailed analysis that I can provide here, though I am confident 
that these basic judgments survive such an analysis.11  Amongst the many issues that 
would be involved in this further analysis are two raised by Adolf himself.  First 
whether we need to talk in terms of known independent testability rather than in terms 
of independent testability in the logical, platonic sense. And secondly whether the 
notion of independent testability (whether known or not) is capable of a precise 
logical definition devoid of any ‘pragmatic’ element. 
 
As this indicates there is certainly still life in these issues – just as there is, as I argued 
earlier, in the issue about content-increase through so-called scientific revolutions. 
Life after Grünbaum – certainly; but it’s life informed, and improved, by Grünbaum. 
 
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
April 2003 
 
                                                 
11 For an elaboration of the claims made in the last two paragraphs and for at least the beginnings of the 
more detailed analysis promised here see my (2002) – actually written for the IUHPS conference in 
Krakow August 1999. 
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